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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900078-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a 
motion to suppress in the Sixth Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-2(e) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was the inventory search of defendant's vehicle 
proper? 
2. Did defendant consent to the blood test? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, 
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of 
review. State v. Johnson, 771, P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
places to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 
(Supp. 1989); possession of marijuana, a class "B" misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989); 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor, 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1989). A hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress was held January 4, 1990, in 
the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Garfield County, 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge, presiding (R. 69, T. 1). 
This Court granted an interlocutory appeal from Judge Tibbs' 
order denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 82). 
The transcript of the suppression hearing is designated as MT 
The preliminary hearing transcript is designated as "P." The 
record is designated as MR." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 23, 1989, between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m., a Ford 
Bronco driven by defendant went off the road and collided with an 
embankment on the Bullfrog-Notom Road near the Burr Trail in 
Garfield County (P. 17, 19, 107). Four persons were in the 
vehicle, defendant, his wife, Donald Dudry, and Michelle Eckroth 
(P. 55-56, 104-05, 108-09). 
Deputy Shawn Draper of the Garfield County Sheriff's 
Department arrived at the accident scene at approximately 3:00 
p.m. (P. 17). Draper was the only sheriff's deputy patrolling 
the remote area (T. 47). Draper surveyed the accident scene and 
aided the injured passengers (P. 18). At the scene, defendant 
approached Draper and asked him to take custody of some firearms 
in defendant's possession. Ici. The conversation ended as 
defendant joined his wife and Dudrey in the ambulance (P. 19). 
A helicopter arrived to transport Ekroth to the 
hospital in Page, Arizona (P. 25. 40). The ambulance transported 
the other victims to the nearby Bullfrog Clinic (P. 25, 39, 42). 
Draper remained to secure defendant's vehicle and wait for the 
tow truck to arrive. Ici. While waiting, Draper picked up some 
pillows, blankets, and other items that were left at the scene. 
Id. However, when he tried to put them in defendant's vehicle, 
he discovered that defendant had locked the vehicle before 
leaving in the ambulance (P. 25, T. 51). When the tow truck 
arrived, Draper and the tow truck driver used a "slim jim" to 
open defendant's vehicle (P. 25-26, 28, T. 51). 
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Draper considered the position and location of 
defendant's vehicle a hazard to itself and other traffic (P. 29-
30, T. 49) (See Addendum "A"; Photo). The vehicle was inoperable 
and the windshield was broken, apparently when it was struck by 
Ms. Eckroth's head (P. 29, T. 62). Prior to towing the vehicle, 
Draper conducted an inventory of the contents of the vehicle (P. 
25-26, 27-28, T. 50) (See Addendum "B"; Inventory List). Draper 
followed the Garfield County Sheriff Department's procedures for 
conducting an inventory search (P. 26, T. 51, 53) (See Addendum 
"C"; Inventory Procedure). During the inventory, Draper opened a 
film canister containing a green, leafy substance which he 
suspected was marijuana (P. 26, 31-32, 54, T. 55-56, 64). 
Draper suspended his inventory search when he was 
notified that defendant would not be transported to Page, Arizona 
with the other victims (P. 39, T. 54). He proceeded to the 
Bullfrog Clinic to obtain a blood sample from defendant (P. 38, 
T. 54). Meanwhile, defendant's vehicle was towed to Draper's 
home in Ticaboo, Utah (T. 65). 
At the Bullfrog Clinic, Draper read defendant a 
standard DUI form and informed defendant he needed to take a 
blood test (P. 44). Peter Hollis, a licensed physician's 
assistant, explained to defendant that Draper wanted him to draw 
2 
defendant's blood and asked for defendant's consent (T. 13). 
Defendant said, "Yes. Go ahead and do it." Id. 
Under the Bullfrog Clinic's written policy, Hollis could draw 
blood for DUI tests only if requested by a peace officer and if 
the patient consented (T. 10) (See Addendum "D"; Policy). 
_A_ 
Defendant's vehicle was later towed to the State's 
impound lot in Hanksville, Utah (T. 70). When Draper was able to 
resume his inventory of the vehicle, he found drug paraphernalia 
in a closed tupperware container (P. 46-49, T. 56). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Deputy Draper conducted a lawful inventory search. 
While defendant argues that his rights were violated under both 
the Utah and federal constitutions, his lack of separate state 
analysis bars consideration of the state constitutional claim. 
With regard to defendant's federal claim, three valid reasons 
exist for inventory searches: protection of the owner's property; 
protection for police against claims of damaged or stolen 
property; and protection of police from potential danger. 
In the instant case, Draper acted prudently in securing 
defendant's vehicle and having it towed since defendant's vehicle 
was partially protruding into the road and had a broken 
windshield. Likewise, Draper's bifurcated inventory search was 
necessitated by the remoteness of the area, the lack of other law 
enforcement personnel to complete the inventory, and the need for 
Draper to obtain a blood sample from defendant. Defendant's 
claim that the deputy should have opened all containers is absurd 
since opening containers of food would violate the purpose behind 
inventory searches. Also meritless is defendant's claim that the 
lack of the tow truck driver's signature on the inventory should 
invalidate the search. Finally, defendant misreads the record 
when he asserts the deputy conducted an inventory search of the 
vehicle prior to impoundment. 
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Because defendant gave actual consent to withdraw his 
blood, the implied consent law is inapplicable. The trial court 
properly found that defendant consented to the blood test when 
the physician's assistant asked for consent and defendant 
responded, "Yes. Go ahead and do it". Defendant did not testify 
and no evidence of coercion was offered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEPUTY DRAPER CONDUCTED A LAWFUL INVENTORY 
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
Defendant complains that Deputy Draper did not conduct 
a lawful inventory search of defendant's vehicle because Draper 
did not scrupulously comply with Garfield County's vehicle 
inventory policy. Defendant claims Draper's actions violated 
both the United States and Utah constitutions. Defendant's claim 
should be rejected. 
A. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM FOR APPEAL. 
While defendant's motion to suppress mentioned both the 
state and federal constitutions, defendant did not separately 
argue state constitutional grounds except to make a conclusory 
statement that his state constitutional rights were violated (R. 
55-56). This Court has previously stated, "Nominally alluding to 
such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis 
before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to 
permit consideration by this court on appeal." State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d 
(Utah 1989) (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. 
_£_ 
App. 1987)). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to 
make a separate analysis of article I, section 14 when a 
defendant does not assert that the state constitution provides 
greater protection than the federal constitution. State v. 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 n.2 (Utah 1986). See also State v. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 31 n.l (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 
(1989); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986). Cf. State 
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) 
The lower court in the present case had no state 
constitutional arguments before it and could only decide the 
issue based on defendant's rights under the United States 
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 555 A.2d 369, 376-77 
(Vt.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1155 (1989). As pointed out by 
the Utah Supreme Court, "motions to suppress should be supported 
by precise averments, not conclusive allegations." State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). Since 
defendant did not argue a violation of his state constitutional 
rights in any meaningful way in the court below, this Court 
should decline to consider his state constitutional claim on 
appeal. 
B. DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED. 
Defendant asserts that the present case is governed by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 
(1987), and this Court's interpretation of Bertine in State v. 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Specifically, 
defendant complains that: (1) the Garfield County policies do 
-7-
not provide guidance on when a vehicle should be impounded; (2) 
the policies do not provide for bifurcated searches; (3) Deputy 
Draper did not open all containers in defendant's vehicle; (4) 
the tow truck driver's signature was not affixed on the inventory 
list; and (5) the inventory search occurred prior to impoundment. 
Defendant's arguments must fail. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Judge Tibbs 
found that Draper followed proper standardized procedures in 
conducting the inventory search (T. 86) (See Addendum "E"; 
Findings; Conclusions). Based upon these factual findings, Judge 
Tibbs concluded that the inventory search was reasonable and that 
Deputy Draper acted in good faith and not for the purpose of a 
criminal investigation. On appeal, this Court should not disturb 
a lower court's factual assessments underlying its decision to 
deny the suppression motion unless they are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. Findings are clearly 
erroneous only when they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence or when the appellate court is convinced that a mistake 
has been made. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. 
App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 
1990). A correction of error standard should be applied to the 
lower court's legal conclusions. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. 
The seminal case on automobile inventory searches is 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1975). In Opperman, the 
Supreme Court noted that automobiles are frequently taken into 
custody, particularly as the result of automobile accidents. Id. 
at 368. "To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some 
•ft-
circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles 
will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest 
of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control 
activities." Id. at 368-69. The Court explained that inventory 
searches meet three different needs: (1) protection of the 
owner's property; and (2) protection for police against claims of 
damaged or stolen property; and (3) the protection of the police 
from potential danger. JEd. at 369. See also Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
Prior to Opperman, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a bifurcated search of a murder suspect's automobile 
because the police thought the suspect, a Chicago police officer, 
might have his service revolver in the automobile's trunk. Cady 
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 436 (1973). The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the police acted correctly in suspecting that the 
general public might be endangered if an intruder removed a 
revolver from the trunk of the vehicle. Id. at 447. 
Subsequently, the Court held that police officers may 
open closed containers while conducting a routine inventory 
search of an impounded vehicle so long as such inventories are 
conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures. 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76. The Bertine Court 
noted, "Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise 
of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised 
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something 
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Jto. at 
375. 
Last term, the Supreme Court clarified its Bertine 
holding in Florida v. Wellsf 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990). The Supreme 
Court held that M[a] police officer may be allowed sufficient 
latitude to determine whether a particular container should or 
should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and 
characteristics of the container itself." 1^ - a t 1635. The 
Court went on to note, "The allowance of the exercise of judgment 
based on concerns related to the purposes of an inventory search 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court also analyzed the purposes 
behind an inventory search of an automobile in State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). In Hygh, the Supreme Court held that the 
State has the burden of establishing the necessity of taking an 
inventory of a vehicle. IdL at 268. The Hygh court was 
particularly concerned with the search because it seemed apparent 
that the inventory was nothing more than a pretext for conducting 
an investigative search. JEd. at 270. See also State v. Johnson/ 
745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987). 
This Court has also addressed the issue of what 
constitutes a valid inventory search. State v. Shamblin, 763 
P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Shamblin Court read Bertine 
to require standardized, specific procedures mandating the 
opening of all closed containers in order to prevent police 
officers from acting arbitrarily and selectively while conducting 
inventory searches. Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 428-29. However, the 
recent Wells decision casts doubt on requiring police to be this 
rigid. Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635. 
1. IMPOUNDMENT PROCEDURES. 
Addressing each of defendant's assertions in turn, he 
first argues that the fruits of the inventory search should be 
suppressed because Garfield County does not have standardized 
criteria for determining when a vehicle should be impounded. 
Defendant's claim is meritless. 
In the absence of specific statutory authority upon 
which to justify the impoundment of a vehicle, a court must "look 
to the circumstances surrounding the stop to determine whether 
the impound was reasonable." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. In 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated that "the existence or absence of justification 
for the impoundment of an automobile may be determined from the 
surrounding circumstances." 3jd. (citing State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 
695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268.) There, the 
Court found justification for impoundment where (1) the vehicle 
was parked in the middle of a motel parking lot blocking traffic, 
(2) the vehicle had an out-of-town sticker in lieu of license 
plates, (3) the defendant did not have a driver's license, and 
(4) the defendant and his friends who were present were under 
arrest for being under the influence of a controlled substance. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d at 454. Under these circumstances, the Los 
Angeles police officer was found justified in impounding the 
vehicle which could not have been properly moved by the defendant 
or his friends. Id. See also People v. Scigliano# 196 Cal. App. 
3d 26, 241 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548 (1987) (police properly impounded 
vehicle without windshield). 
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In the instant case, defendant's incapacitated Bronco 
had a broken windshield and was sitting on the road at an angle 
partially blocking one lane of traffic. It presented a hazard to 
all oncoming traffic and was incapable of moving under its own 
power (P. 29-30, T. 49, 50, 62) (See Addendum "A"; Photo). 
Defendant and his passengers were injured and had been 
transported by ambulance and helicopter to medical care 
facilities. Under these circumstances, Draper not only had 
justification to take control over the vehicle, but would have 
been derelict in his duty not to do so. Thus, the absence of 
standardized procedures for determining when to impound a vehicle 
should not be a constitutional defect when the impoundment was 
clearly reasonable under the circumstances. 
2. BIFURCATED INVENTORY SEARCHES. 
Next, defendant asserts the inventory search evidence 
should be suppressed because the Garfield County policy does not 
provide for bifurcated inventory searches. Defendant's claim 
must fail. 
Bifurcated searches, by themselves, have never 
constituted a constitutional violation. The search in Cady v. 
Dombrowski, for example, occurred in two parts. There, the Court 
attached no significance to a bifurcated search of a vehicle, 
conducted pursuant to standard police procedure for the 
protection of the public, in which officers sought a revolver 
they believed the defendant was carrying. 413 U.S. at 436-37, 
443. A search of the defendant's vehicle was conducted at the 
scene of the accident in which it was involved and later at a 
garage to which it had been towed. I^d. at 436-37. 
Likewise, in State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court attached no significance to the 
fact that officers made a preliminary search of an automobile, 
had it towed, and then conducted a full inventory search at the 
impound lot. The obvious point of Cady, and Earl is that if both 
parts of the bifurcated warrantless search are legally justified, 
there is no fourth amendment violation. £f. United States v. 
Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 959 (11th Cir. 1990) (police may not in the 
absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement 
re-examine, for evidentiary purposes, items previously 
inventoried). 
In the instant case, Deputy Draper suspended the 
inventory search because he was notified that defendant would not 
be transported to Page, Arizona (T. 54). As the only deputy in 
the area, Draper had to prioritize his duties (T. 80). Draper 
testified that he intended to secure a blood sample, and then 
complete the inventory (T. 54). He also needed to complete his 
investigation of the accident scene and transport a prisoner (T. 
76, 81). Considering the exigent circumstances, it was not 
unreasonable for Draper to complete his inventory search 
subsequent to his other duties. Defendant does not claim that 
either of Draper's inventory searches, standing alone, violated 
the fourth amendment. Therefore, his challenge to the bifurcated 
inventory search is meritless. 
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3. CLOSED CONTAINERS. 
Next, defendant complains that Draper, in conducting 
3 
the inventory search, did not open all closed containers. 
Specifically, defendant urges the suppression of the marijuana 
and drug paraphernalia because Draper did not open "food boxes" 
or "cans of food" (T. 73-74). Defendant's assertion is absurd. 
As noted above, three legitimate purposes exist for an 
inventory search: (1) protection of the owner's property; (2) 
protection for police against damaged or stolen property; and (3) 
the protection of the police from potential danger. Opperman, 
428 U.S. at 369. In State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), this Court interpreted Bertine to "establish that the 
Fourth Amendment ijs violated if closed containers are opened 
during a vehicle inventory search in the absence of a 
standardized, specific procedure mandating their opening." Ici. at 
427-28 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In a 
footnote, this Court stated that the same result is reached 
through a different analysis apparently adopted by at least five 
Bertine justices, i.e., that "'it is permissible for police 
officers to open closed containers in an inventory search only if 
they are following standard police procedures that mandate the 
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle.'" JEd. at 
428 n.6 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)). Thus, this Court suggested that a "'total absence 
The Garfield County Sheriff's Department written policy 
requires that a "written inventory shall be made of all contents 
of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers." 
(See Addendum "C"; Inventory Procedures) 
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accord; ^ c * -* -d-M 'Titer-r n^«l o: "l> bat- .£ ci something 
other . .u.. . r
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16: L (quoting Bertine, ** - he Wells .c^r* further 
exr^a :^^d +»--*+ ' ^ c 1 : -e officer may be allowed sufficient 
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should not be openeo :. \ : the nature oL the search and 
characteristics of the container itself , ' 1:1, The Court said 
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whose contents otiicers determine they are unable to ascertain 
J i icHYiin i i»i J K J , he containers ' exteriors , " Id , 1* n .sum, t he Court 
i n s t r u c t e d I I ill I.he e x e i c i Lie Il iiiidtjiiieii'i! IJdbtMl n .HICHI i w > 
r e l a t e d t o 1 he p u r p o s e s of an i n v e n t o r y search doet. not. n u l a t o 
1 11 i'" F' n I i J i" t h A m e n d m e n t Il i I  I  i Il i q h 1 o f t h e ma j o i • 11 y o p i n i o n i n 
W e l l s , i t a p p e a r s t h a t nnn« mi i i i II mil in j I i cm ,i!dL»pit;j i i
 (' i n "" 
Shamblin Court, based on its reading of Bertine, is no longer 
4 
viable. 
Applying the Wells standard to the present case, Fourth 
Amendment procedures were followed. Deputy Draper testified that 
he opened all containers in the vehicle, except "food boxes" and 
"cans of food" (T. 73-74). While the standardized procedures he 
followed required a written inventory of all contents of "opened, 
closed and/or locked containers," he believed that the intent of 
the policy was not to open "cans of food, etc." (T. 74) (Addendum 
"C"; Inventory Procedures). Indeed, opening cans of food for 
spoilage would cut directly against one of the stated purposes of 
inventorying vehicle contents, i.e., to protect the vehicle 
owner's property. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. 
Food boxes and cans of food, particularly if 
commercially sealed, would fit within the Wells description of 
containers whose contents officers may ascertain by examining the 
containers' exteriors. See Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635. By 
allowing police officers to exercise some common-sense 
discretion, an officer should be permitted to note on her written 
inventory list that the minister's picnic basket, grandma's 
knitting bag, the biker's tool box, or the gypsy's satchel 
contains a sealed tin of Copenhagen snuff. £f. Shamblin 763 P.2d 
at 428. Certainly, an officer's decision not to open "food 
It must be noted that three separate concurrences in Wells, 
joined by an aggregate of four justices, criticized the majority 
opinion for rejecting, in dictum, the "all or nothing" test. 
Wells, 110 S.Ct. at 1635-40. However, dictum or not, the clear 
majority interprets Bertine to allow some discretion by police 
officers in conducting inventory searches. Ijd. at 1635. 
_1 C_ 
boxes" oi" "cans of iv ' 'I should not invalidate an otherwise 
proper *j» t n n search conducted in good faith in accordance 
with s tandardized wr11ten procedui ow , 
Ii'i addition, the evidence reveals, and the trial court 
t'f'Mi.iiii I t Inii 1 IIDnvi '!i WiTi!". artimi 11 quod faith i n ronducting the 
inventory for the cliidl purpose ul protect, i nij < lei erulri n l ' '•' proper t;y 
- I avoiding liabi 1 ity , and not for criminal investigative 
purposes, (See Addendum '""H"" ; Findinqr. Conclusions) . Draper 
testified that he was simpiy securing delendanl ".!.'. > /whit. U- dm I ml 
contents (T, 79 | He stated that he did not suspect that. 
contraband H • 'onl a i n< Il i IMI dof end ant " &
 v ehicie. l_d. He simpi^ 
came upon the marijuana as part of h i s i nventory. Id. 
Accordj ngly, thi s Court shou 1 d not disturb the lower cour t's 
f 11 i a t t: 1 i s • 1 n i e n t o r ] > s e a :I : c 1 I w a s n c • t: a j: i e t e x t u a 1 
i n v e s t i g a t i v e s e a r c h . John sen i., 7 II 1 I 2d a t 3 2 II ' . 
4 CI ISTODY TRANSFER, 
E- ' - • -•- d i d 
not s i g n th* pa t i d h mipieted i n v e n u i \ . . ^ w t i . i t i iwxi.g 
d< a*pnn a ' ' -*f • -. thf- ^ pnt o: rf <-> a;.\ : de : * * he . n v e n t o r y 
V i 1 1 ( i III 1 III lllli "III " II III IK 1 ( l i l t " III ll III 
N - a t i l e t e n d a n t , tes> iu a u t h o r i t y for t h e 
p r o p o s e jf *. . r a t u r e s h o u l d l e a d t o 
£ j
 1111- :* h* - ' B e i ' t u i e a 11* I Shambli J i. 
5 
T^e Qar£j_e2>cj c o u n t y Sheri f:l:J s Department procedure on 
inventory searches states that '[w]hen custody of the wreliicl e 
changes from one person to another, the person taking custody of 
the vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing 
his/her signature on the inventory list," ( T . 65-66)(See 
Addendum M/n,H - Inventory Procedure). 
Il I -
However, both Bertine and Shamblin deal with the conduct of the 
actual inventory search, not the ministerial function of 
transferring custody* In actuality, defendant's claim is a chain 
of custody issue which does not involve search and seizure 
principles. In the absence of a claim that he was prejudiced by 
the lack of the tow truck driver's signature, defendant's chain 
of custody claim should be disregarded. 
5. IMPOUNDMENT BEFORE INVENTORY. 
Defendant claims that the inventory occurred prior to 
impoundment. Defendant misreads the facts. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense 
counsel asked Draper when he thought the vehicle had been 
"impounded" (T. 74). Draper responded that he thought the 
vehicle was impounded when the sheriff told him the vehicle would 
be held for forfeiture. Ici. However, on redirect examination, 
Draper testified that his understanding of the word "impound" 
meant when the state or the county takes "possession" of the 
vehicle (T. 80). Draper said that he was in "custody" of the 
vehicle, was holding it for the owner, and needed to secure the 
vehicle and its contents (T. 80-81). 
Based upon this testimony, Judge Tibbs specifically 
found that (1) defendant's vehicle was left unattended partially 
blocking one lane of the road and creating a potential danger to 
traffic safety; (2) Deputy Draper impounded the vehicle due to 
his concern for public safety, the absence of its occupants, and 
the lack of alternative arrangements; and (3) Deputy Draper 
conducted an at the scene inventory search of the vehicle for the 
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purpose of protecting himsel* *~A ^ariield County from liabi] ity 
for -5.cables irside **<• .*<\ir e ( See Addendum E"; Findings; 
C Ii111 I In i i impoundment -M 
def* , ' 'eh.,ie •% ••oiiaiji« .. the inventory sea: .:. -as 
conducted essen'iail- * -furmitv * i.th standardized procedures 
for the pur pi ib- I d » 
Applying trie appropriate standard c f appellate review, 
thii r:'^i: ' -"'^  •-* - dip^.M* ludqe Tibts' factual determination 
t • , -' - • J D l l C 
s a ! - ' •--'.' . ab - i t y c o n c e n t Consiufe. j i y ; nt? ci~ ..urnstaxiCv.'S 
surround:*- - * v* n r i o p , i ! * -mn'-t be ra id t h a t Deputy . raper 
acte.. •-'- '-• * 
stranded venicl- . 
POINT II : 
DEFENHAN'i UJNSKNTKI n l MI H] n< TFSrl 
Defer: iant argues that hj s blood sample must be 
si lppressed since he ^iri not consent +n f h ^ di awing of the sample 
and the persons drawing the bJ > »jd wen ' i » ii, i i • *•" i ' y 
the implied consent statute. Defendant i» claim must tail. 
There are two cle.ir circumstances « wlu« I blood test 
may be drawi :i wi tl 101-I , warrant ' k'ici" i i |n«i|n i | y sn 
under" the influence oj alcohol oi drugs: (1) when probable cause 
exi sts and exi gei it '' i rcumstanrps !irc< present, Schmerber v . 
California, 38 I D S " l'"if'l( i " » ,,l jrtuai ;cn^en"l 
given, State v. Pasem > I 1 M Hi!1, l,' A (Utah (It, A y lIJI" 
Regan" i i , ' • prc.n.l > "urnstancc Hi i r Court ic-o^flY held that 
where actual ecuiseiit • »>
 Mii< n fin II " ' r r » i ( l i ;j rue 
admissible, Pi. s :uf. / '4 1'.2d tit *» I 4 
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In Pascoe, the defendant was the driver of a pickup 
truck which crossed the center line, struck an oncoming vehicle, 
and killed the other driver instantly. Id. at 513. The defendant 
was transported to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. 
Id. At the hospital, police officers informed the defendant that 
they wanted a blood sample because they had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Jd. The defendant responded, "Okay," and extended his 
arm for the technician to draw blood. Jd. At a pretrial motion 
to suppress the blood test results, the trial court found that 
even if the defendant was not under arrest for purposes of the 
implied consent statute, he had consented to the blood test and 
therefore the results were admissible. On appeal, this Court 
found that because actual consent was given, it was unnecessary 
for the defendant to be arrested prior to the blood test. 3xi. at 
514 (citing State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307, 309 
(1968)). 
In the present case, defendant consented to the blood 
test. Deputy Draper told defendant that in an accident resulting 
in an injury, he was required to give a blood sample (T. 60). 
However, before drawing the blood sample, Mr. Hollis, a 
physician's assistant, asked defendant if he would consent to 
giving a sample of blood (T. 10, 13). Mr. Hollis's request was 
pursuant to the Bullfrog Clinic's policy that an alcohol blood 
test may be made only at the request of law enforcement personnel 
and with the consent of the patient (See Addendum "D"; Policy). 
In response to Hollis's request, defendant said, "Yes. Go ahead 
-20-
and : ~ Base-" *h"? testimony, Judge m:hbs 
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vund that d^^er *^~t twice f'^ o^T:1 * tue b-jod
 v-- -_) 
appeal, defendant argues that Draper's statement to 
•"<iar,»- /-H-.^r ,-f.. i the ^^pc^^1 ^r:^f • f App ' However, 
tne - "i 1 I 
w a s rinythinc bu: •/cJuntary " • derendai. :. i t e s t i f y . 
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procedures *vre ^ot followed ^3-54;,. See State v. Steggell, 
660 r.2a 25" ~L ^rr^Il^te m n will not consider 
matters ra i _ - . •- . , . . ,.; , . . 
This C >urt need letermine whethe; *"• ".milled 
-* r ** '"reciures weie followed in Uiv
 r-r--( rr r^se. As 
tiia. • , ui i : ur, . *ro& it- W ^ Q n n n e c e s s a r v . : e . _ e 
»-»: t K ieff idant w a s u n a e ; arrest.
 s • r e o . i r e d ty t.he i m p l i e d 
-• '"•-: irv • .-.--. -so-:* P * ^  i .1 le 
b l o o d t e s t . Likewise . .b in i n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e i n t h e 
p r e s e n t c a s t w h e t h e r ' i r pa ramed ic and p h y s i c i a n ' s a s s i s t a n t were 
d'i-"T I lie,<" I! I' 11In imp] i Ei :i Consen t S t a t u t e , 
i u h i a i } Luiibt * . , su t f i c i e n t ui ider I::l le Four t h 
\ lmer.t — Schnjh h I »-»th v . B u s t a m o n t e , 412 U.S. 218 (II 9 73 ) ; 
b t a i c ^ . v . .± ^ ^ i' ill :il 0 3 ( U I .- L1 1 9 8 0 ) 
F u r t h f r , thtr uwnoeiisual b l o o d t e s I: w a s pe r fo rmed i n a 
in I a sonabJ e manner ( l i by a p h y s i c i a n ' s a s s i s t a n t
 r ( ? ) who wa 
t r t J i in in" 1 1 , in i in 1 1 i mi i j d I in | ii i » 1 1 | 1 1 in in 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 ii 1 1 1 in i in in in in i I in H I in i • in 1 - r t f i i n n ,. 
iiiiiiill | 1| i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h slci i idaid m e d i c a l p r o c e d u r e s (b^e 
Addendum ME"; Findings, Conclusions). £f. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1965) (compelled blood test based 
upon probable cause was reasonable where the blood was taken by a 
physician in a hospital according to accepted medical practices). 
Accordingly, the blood test was properly obtained and correctly 
ruled. 
In the instant case, the State put on clear evidence of 
consent and the judge found consent to be present (T. 13, 85-86). 
See Pascoe, 774 P.2d at 514. In light of the unimpeached 
evidence that defendant consented to the blood test, this Court 
should not disturb the lower court's factual finding of consent. 
See State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98, 99 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the lower court's denial of the motion to suppress and 
remand the case for trial. /^ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^ X " d a y of September, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
__2=%*, J£^k2&~ 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
oo_ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 

ADDENDUM B 
VEHICLE INVENTORY 
SUBJECT: MICHAEL STERGER, BLUE BRONCO 
CASE# 89-150 
VEHICLE REMOVED FROM SCENE OF ACCIDENT-ON BURR TRAIL. 
VEHICLE WAS TOWED/STORED FOR SAFE KEEPING, AND A SUBSEQUENT 
INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE WAS MADE FOR THAT REASON. 
1-TARP 
1 DUFFLE TYPE BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING, 1-PR. BINOCULARS, 1-MAG-LIGHT 
1-SLEEPING BAG, 1-PR. TENNIS SHOES. 
MISC. FOOD & KITCHEN ITEMS THRU-OUT VEHICLE 
1-PR. SUNGLASSES WXCASE 
2-AIR MATTRESSES 
2-SKI ROPES 
1-AIR PUMP 
1-BAG OF ROCKS 
1-FOLDING SHOVEL 
1-PKG. MATCHES 
1-FIRST AID KIT 
1-MIRROR 
1-SET OF BOATING BOOKS, OTHER MISC. BOOKS 
1-AIR COMPRESSOR, LIGHTER TYPE 
4-LAWN CHAIRS 
1-BROWN BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING 
2-PR. SUNGLASSES 
1-PR. THONGS 
1-BACKGAMMON GAME SET 
1-TENT W/CASE 
1-GREEN LAUNDRY TYPE BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING, 1-FOLDING SAW, 1-RED 
BOAT FLAG, 1-LARGE TUPPERWARE CONTAINER W/MISC. DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, SEEDS, ETC. 
1-TOOL BOX W/MISC. TOOLS 
1-PR. JUMPER CABLES 
1-BLUE BAG W/MISC. PERSONAL ITEMS, CONTACT LENS CASE, MINI-MAG 
LIGHT, MISC. LOOSE CHANGE 
1-BROWN CANVAS BAG W/MISC. CLOTHING 
3-PILLOWS 
1-LARGE FOOD COOLER W/MISC. POP, 16 CANS OF BUDWEISER BEER 
3-QTS. OIL 
2-SLEEPING BAGS 
1-FLASHLIGHT 
MISC. TRASH BAGS 
1-TRASH BAG CONTAINING MISC. TOOLS(SOCKETS) 
1-AIR MATTRESS (UNOPENED) 
1-PR. SHOES 
1-FISHING BOX W/MISC. LURES, ETC. 
2-WATER JUGS 
2-BLANKETS 
2-BUDGIE CORDS JE5ES5S 
INVENTORY (CONT.) 
1-PURSE/BAG W/MISC. BOOKS, CLOTHING 
2-BOXES .38CAL AMMO 
2-BOXES .357CAL AMMO 
5-CAN COOLERS 
1-ROLL OF TAPE 
1-SHEET 
1-LARGE WATER JUG 
1-TOW STRAP 
1-BOX W/MEDICINES,BANDAGES,SUNTAN LOTIONS, ETC. 
1-BROWN CAMERA CASE W/MISC. FILM, 2-FLASHERS, 1-X-TRA LENS, 
1-CANNON AE-1 CAMERA, 1-PLASTIC FILM CANISTER W/GREEN LEAFY 
SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA). 
i-DECK OF CARDS 
i-ZOOM LENS 
MISC. FOOD CONTAINERS, MAPS 
2-PR. GLOVES 
1-CASSETTE CASE W/30 CASSETTE TAPES, 1-COMPASS, 2-LIGHTERS 
1-COBRA C.B. RADIO 
1-KODAK CAMERA 
1-CANNON AE-1 CAMERA (LOOSE) 
3-ONE DOLLAR BILLS IN GLOVE BOX (*3.00) 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT THE SCENE OF THE 
ACCIDENT BY MR. STER6ER, HE ASKED THAT I SECURE THEM. THESE 
ITEMS WERE LATER, TURNED OVER TO CARL HUNT, TO BE STORED ALONG 
WITH STERGER'S VEHICLE. MR. STERGER WITNESSED THE ABOVE. 
1-GRAY CASE W/1-KNIFE, 2-BOXES 9MM AMMO, 3-BOXES OF FILM, 1-9MM 
S&W AUTOMATIC PISTOL. 
1-GRAY CASE W/1-RUGER .357 MAG. REVOLVER, 2-LOOSE-.38CAL BULLETS. 
ALL DRUG/ALCOHOL ITEMS REMOVED FROM VEHICLE AND PLACED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
WITNESSES TO INITIAL INVENTORY (AT SCENE): CARL HUNT, JAN HUNT. 
WITNESS TO REMAINDER OF INVENTORY (AT IMPOUND YARD): CARL HUNT. 
ADDENDUM C 
Garfield Ootnty Sheriff Department 
4.03 Court Cases and Appearances 
(1) Employees shall not negotiate any canpronise or arrangement permitting 
any person to escape the penalty of the law or far any reason interfere with the 
court of justice. This shall not prevent any employee from cooperating with the 
* County Attorney in te^ interest of justice. 
(2) Deputies appearing in cases before the courts shall be punctual. 
They stall dress in uniform. 
(3) Deputies shall properly prepare cases with which they are involved 
and shall arrange for presentation in court of all property to be used as 
evidence. 
(4) At all times employees shall testify with accuracy and truth and 
conduct themselves in a professional manner and in accordance with the law 
enforcement code of ethics. 
4.04 Search and Rescuse Operations 
Search and rescue operations shall not be initiated by enployees without 
«^the approval of the Sheriff or Chief Deputy. In lefe-threatening situations, 
the deputy shall act in the best interest of the victim, notifying supervisors 
as soon as possible. 
4.05 Vehicle Inventories 
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried. A written inventory shall 
be made of all contents of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers. 
The truck and also any compartments shall be opened and the contents inventoried. 
All evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in the evidence locker. Such 
record shrill become a part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes 
from one person to another, the person taking custody of the vehicle shall also 
assume custody of the contents by placing his/her signature on the inventory list. 
(2) When a vehicle is removed on a hold-far-owner basis, immediate steps 
shall be taken to locate the owner and inform him of the location of the vehicle 
and how he may regain possession. If the owner cannot be located with 24 hours, 
the vehicle shall be impounded. 
(3) When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the Influence, improper 
registration, stolen or abandoned, the officer shall immediately complete a 
Utah State Tax Gcnmission infpound report and take to the Tax Oammission( Assessors 
Office). After the impound report has been taken care of, the officer shall not 
authorize the release of the vehicle without express consent of the Tax Commission 
or until the $25.00 inbound fee has been paid by the owner of said vehicle. 
(4) When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for hold-far-evidence, the 
officer shall cause notice to be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle 
is being held as evidence and he shall immediatley advise the Sheriff and the 
County Attorney. Such vehicle shall not be released without permission from 
the Sheriff or County Attorney. 
Policy and Procedures Manual 
(5) Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the responsibility 
of the owner except for hold-for-evidence and seized vehicles. In such cases 
finaittzial arrangements for storage charges should be made through the County 
Attorney or the Sheriff. Any vehicle impounded and stored at the Sheriff's 
Inp3uod lot shall be subject to a minimum charge of $3.00 per ralander day. 
Storage fees to begin on the second day of impound. 
(6) All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be sur-
rendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle is released. 
4.06 Hazardeous Materials Emergency Response 
(1) The first officer dispatched to a hazardeous materials emergency will 
approach and remain upwind(if possible) a safe distance from the spill. 
(2) Tte officer will secure the scene and set up a command post at which 
location dispatch will send all responding units for guidance. 
(3) If the container is cm fire, withdraw from the area, call for trained 
personnel, and consider area evacuation. 
(4) In all cases, the incident should be handled by trained hazardeous 
materials responders if possible. 
(5) Once substance is identified and if there is no leaking product, no 
smoke or fixe, and minor damage to container, first responder can then approach 
with caution. 
(6) Any fire units, ambulances, or wreckers called on the scene are to be 
advised of the hazardeous situation at once. 
4.07 Domestic Disputes 
It is the policy of the Garfield County Sheriff that in the event of a 
domestic dispute, two(2) officers will respond, even if an officer has to be 
called out. 
ADDENDUM D 
Eiu] If rog Clinic 
Source; Nursing Administration 
Approval; Administration 
Subject; Alcohol level blood test 
Category; Policy 
Date; 6/84 
Page; 1 
law enforcement 
Clinic personnel (R.N., p.A., N.P.) may on request from law.-, enfoi cement 
personnel and with consent of the patient draw a blood sample for purposes 
of Alcohol level determination. The sample will be drawn only with consent 
of the patient and be given directly to the requesting officer. The clinic 
is not equipped to do the analysis on site. 
This is a true and correct copy as filed in our office. 
Kev i n 
^ t'c^s* 
Poorten, Administrator 
?£> 
ADDENDUM E 
WALLACE A. LEE #5306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 676-2290 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO, \?&fi0 FILED 
FEB- 11330 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 3368 
Civil No. 3350 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before 
the above-entitled Court, Don V. Tibbs District Judge presiding, 
on January 4, 1990, on defendants Motions to Suppress and 
Defendant being personally present before the Coin t and 
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster, and the State 
of Utah being represented by Wallace -'•. Garfield County 
Attorney, and certain witnesses having beei ~^  
testified, HK! ••erl.-iin exhibits having beei; submitted to the 
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes and enters its1 Findings of - - • -rid <'one I us:i oris of I .aw as 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1.. Defendant Michael Allen Sterger, was ? :;> alleged 
driver of a vehicle involved in a collision on the Note }.=ul of 
Eckroth was mjuied, Thr-> i uJ I ision occurred on July 23, 1989, 
md Michelle Eckroth allegedly later died of injuries sustained 
in the collision. 
2. r^ : raper is a Garfield County Deputy 
Sheriff, and is the investigating officer in this case. Deputy 
Draper is the only deputy sheriff coveiIIi the iemoter area of 
Eastern Garf iel -i Dunty. 
3. After the collision, the said Michelle F - •-
defendant and two other passengers in ihe defendants' vehicle 
were transported from the scene by ambulance and were taken to 
Bullfrog Clinic where all but the defendant wer e ai r 1 1 f ted 2 1 1 a 
helicopter to Page Hosp . Defendant's vehicle was left 
111lattended, and partially blocking one lane of the road, creating 
a potential danger to the safety of peer * . : .:. . he road. 
4. Deputy :'.-r.:ip_r impounded defendant s vehicle due to 
his concern for public safety, and since defendant an.i every one 
of his party had been transported away tn --/e^ e , there were 
no alternative arrangements which could be made for revoval of 
the vehicle. 
After impounding * •=:•;.- it_-. scene of the 
collision, - .n^er began conducting an inventory search of 
the vehicle, for purposes of protecting himself and the Garfield 
County Sheriff's Department '• • acuity for valuables 
ins'H*- , e. In conducting the inventory search ;-ep*-ity 
Draper substantially complied with regularized -
Garfield County Sheriff's Depai: 1. oieri l As a result of this 
inventory search, Deputy Draper seized a black film canister 
containing a green leafy substance later analyzed and determined 
to be marijuana, 
6. Deputy Draper did not continue his inventory of the 
vehicle at the scene, because he was notified that Michelle 
Eckroth had died, and another passenger in the vehicle was 
accusing the defendant of drinking. Deputy Draper felt compelled 
to interrupt the inventory to go to Bullfrog Clinic to draw 
defendant's blood for a determination of alcohol content. There 
were no other Sheriff's deputies in the area that could have 
assisted Deputy Draper. 
7. Defendant's car was towed to Deputy Draper's 
residence, in Ticaboo, Utah, by Karl Hunt and was secured. 
8. Defendant was at the Bullfrog Clinic when Deputy 
Draper arrived. Defendant had not been transported to Page by 
helicopter with the other passengers of the vehicle and Michelle 
Eckroth, due to lack of space in the helicopter. 
9. Bullfrog Clinic is a satellite clinic of Good 
Samaritan Hospital Corporation in Phoenix, Arizona, and is built 
on National Park Service land within the Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the National Park Service. 
10. The internal policy of the Bullfrog Clinic and 
Good Samaritan, permits staff physician's assistants of the 
Bullfrog Clinic to draw blood for investigative purposes at the 
request of a law enforcement officer, and with the consent of the 
patient. 
11. Defendant was told by Deputy Draper that he was 
required to submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a 
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of a 
passenger. Defendant submitted to the blood test. 
12. Prior to drawing the blood, additional consent of 
the defendant was obtained by Bullfrog Clinic Physician's Assis-
tant Peter Hollis. 
13. Peter Hollis is licensed as a Physicianfs Assis-
tant by the State of Utah to practice under the supervision and 
direction of Dr. Dennis Little, a physician licensed in the State 
of Utah, and on the staff of Good Samaritan Hospital in Page, 
Arizona. Dr. Little was not present at the time the blood was 
taken, nor was there any consultation with Dr. Little. 
14. Peter Hollis is trained and qualified to perform 
venipuncture for purposes of drawing blood, by college training 
in the Yale University Physician's Assistant program, and by 
experience in a clinical setting. 
15. Venipuncture, including drawing of blood, is a 
regular part of Peter Hollis' activities as a physician's assis-
tant at Bullfrog Clinic. 
16. Peter Hollis was assisted in drawing the defen-
dant's blood by Pat Quinn, National Park Service Park Medic. 
17. Pat Quinn is a National Park Service certified 
Level 5 Park Medic, and is trained and qualified to conduct 
venipuncture and draw blood. 
18. Pat Quinn regularly draws blood in a clinical 
setting as part of his normal activities as a Park Medic, and 
regularly assists the physician's assistant at the Bullfrog 
Service has adopted policy guidelines which allow Level 5 certi-
fied Park Medics to conduct venipuncture. Local Glen Canyon 
Office orders also allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct 
venipuncture. 
19. Prior to attempting to insert a needle to draw 
blood from defendant's veins, Physician's Assistant Peter Hollis 
and Park Medic Pat Quinn cleansed the defendant's skin with 
Betadine solution and water rather than alcohol, as a precaution 
to avoid any possible taint of alcohol in the sample. 
20. Peter Hollis twice attempted to insert a catheter 
for withdrawal of defendant's blood, but both times collapsed 
defendant's vein. He then requested Park Medic Pat Quinn to 
attempt to find a vein. Pat Quinn was successful in inserting a 
catheter into defendant's vein, Peter Hollis then withdrew the 
blood of defendant, inserted it into two vials, enclosed the 
vials in a plastic bag and gave them directly to Deputy Shawn 
Draper. 
21. Peter Hollis and Pat Quinn followed standard 
medical procedures in withdrawing defendant's blood, in sanitary 
conditions at the Bullfrog Clinic, and took every precaution to 
obtain a proper blood sample. 
22. Due to the remoteness of the area surrounding the 
Burr Trail and the Bullfrog area, the Bullfrog Clinic was the 
only reasonable facility where defendant could have been taken 
for blood to be drawn. The closest alternative facility was 
approximately 2 hours away. 
23. Approximately two (2) days later, after 
investigating the scene of the accident, and transporting the 
defendant to Koosharem,Utah, Deputy Draper returned to finish his 
inventory of defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle was moved 
approximately sixty (60) miles to Hanksville, Utah, and placed in 
the State impound yard. 
24. Prior to resuming his inventory, Deputy Draper 
contacted Garfield County Sheriff Robert V. Judd, who indicated 
that defendant's vehicle had been seized by the State of Utah, 
due to the marijuana found in the first inventory and there was 
no need to obtain a search warrant to resume the inventory. 
25. Deputy Draper continued his inventory for the 
purpose of protecting himself and Garfield County Sheriff Depart-
ment from liability for valuables inside defendant's vehicle. 
26. During the resumed inventory procedure, Deputy 
Draper seized a tupperware container containing items later 
analyzed to be drug paraphernalia. 
27. The inventory search of the defendant's vehicle 
was reasonable and essentially in conformance with Garfield 
County inventory procedures. 
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes and enters 
it's conclusions of law as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), states that only a 
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person 
authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request 
of a Dear.A r\-F-fi ~~— 
2. The Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court, in the 
case of Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P2d 299 (1975), in interpreting the 
predecessor to the current statute which is substantially similar 
to the current Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), expressly found that 
the drawing of blood from a human being constitutes the practice 
of medicine and "falls within the purview of service rendered by 
a physician's assistant.... acting under the supervision and 
direction of a physician." 
3. In this case, due to the circumstances of the 
remote location, lack of reasonable alternative facilities to 
draw the blood, and due to the fact that the blood was drawn by a 
State licensed physician's assistant acting under the supervision 
and direction of a licensed physician and a certified Park Medic, 
fully trained and qualified to draw blood, since conducting 
venipuncture is a routine part of their respective positions, 
since Bullfrog Clinic and National Park Service policies permit 
the drawing of blood, since standard medical procedures were 
followed in sanitary environments, and all precautions were taken 
to avoid any possible contamination of the blood sample, the 
Court finds that the physician's assistant, Peter Hollis, and 
Park Medic, Pat Quinn, were qualified to draw defendant's blood, 
and the resulting blood samples were properly obtained and should 
not be suppressed as evidence. 
4. The Court finds that the defendant twice voluntari-
ly consented to having his blood drawn. 
5. The Court finds there was reasonable and proper 
justification for impoundment of defendant's vehicle for public 
safety reasons, and further finds that the inventory search 
resulting in the seizure of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was 
reasonable, and essentially in conformance with a regularized set 
of procedures which adequately guarded against arbitrariness. 
6. The Court finds that Deputy Draper acted in good 
faith, in conducting the inventory search of defendant's vehicle 
with a purpose of protecting himself and the Garfield County 
Sheriff's Department from liability for valuables inside the 
vehicle. 
In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that defendantCs Motions to 
Suppress the blood sample taken from the defendant and to sup-
press items removed from defendant's vehicle pursuant to Deputy 
Draper's inventory search should be denied. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and coihs^ct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 1st day 
of February, 1990, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 572 
S t . George, Utah 84770 
rdmlix v/) m/ira^ 
Secretary 
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